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IN

THE

SUPREME COURT
OF

THE

STATE OF UTAH

DENISE R. GRAMME,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
CaseNo.

vs.

15420

ANDRE GRAMME,
Defendant and
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff Denise R. Gramme filed an action in divorce.

The

Defendant Andre Gramme answered and counterclaimed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court awarded the Plaintiff a divorce on her Complaint
and also awarded the Defendant a divorce on his Counterclaim.

The Trial

Court found that the value of the marital estate was $650, 000. 00 and
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awarded to the Plaintiff real and personal property having a va lue o;
$200, 000. 00, awarded Plaintiff attorney fees of $8 000 00 and
'
·
costs,
and also awarded to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,400.00 per monthallrr·
The Trial Court awarded to the Defendant real and personal pr ope rt;
a value of $450, 000. 00, which sum included the value of a corporation
which the Trial Court found to have a value of $210, 800. 00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm, in:
entirety, the Decree of Divorce of the Trial Court and asks this Court
award to Plaintiff the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff-Respondento:
Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order to supplement and, in some instances, to correcttn,

Defendant-Appellant's Statement of Fae ts, Plaintiff-Respondent submit'
the following:
At the time of the trial in this matter, the Plaintiff was 50 ye;
of age (R. 12 7), and the Defendant was 51 years of age (R. 3 )·

The Pl;'.:

was 19 years of age when she married the Defendant in Seraing, Bel!iu~
on July 18, 1946 (R. 128).

After the marriage, Defendant entered intc

. ., I
partnership with the Plaintiff's father in the potato wholesale busine>-

- 2 -
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The partnership Lasted until 1948, when the parties immigrated to the
United States.

(R. 128).

The parties moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in

!949, whereupon Plaintiff obtained employment with the Hotel Utah in its
Laundry.

(R. 129).
During the period of time from 1949 through 1969, there was no

substantial period of time when Plaintiff was unemployed and her earnings
were used by the parties for food, utilities and entertainment.

(R. 137).

The type of work performed by Plaintiff during her employment
included working in a laundry (R. 129), working as a presser (R. 130),
working in a cleaning establishment (R. 130, 131), working as a spot welder
in the manufacture of missile heads and as a punch press operator (R. 132),
and assembling jewelry (R. 134, 135).

Between jobs the Plaintiff was never

unemployed for more than two or three weeks.

(R. 227}.

When the Defendant was starting out in the masonry business, the
Plaintiff, after work, helped Defendant clean up the job site and prepare
for the next day's work.

(R.137, 138,417).

After the Plaintiff terminated

her outside employment, she worked for the Defendant and assisted him in
bis business (R. 138, 139).
According to the records of St. Mark's Hospital (Exhibit 37-D),
between L969 and 1975, the Plaintiff was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital
on twelve different occasions:

- 3 -
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1.

On January 15, 1969, Plaintiff was admitted to the,

.

11osp 1 ~

and underwent surgery which consisted of a radical mastectomy f

or la.·

of the left breast.
2.

On January 27, 1971, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospik

and underwent surgery which consisted of a simple mastectomy of the:
breast for fibrocys tic disease and to relieve incapacitating breast pal:,
3.

On April 21, 1972, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital;:

five days of severe vomiting, dizziness and headache and she underwer
surgery consisting of a Marshall-Marchetti repair for urinary incontir•
4.

On August 21, 1972, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

drug ingestion and urinary incontinence.
5.

On January 8, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

after she had five convulsive seizures in a four-day period, and shew,,
admitted for the convulsive disorder.
6.

On February 11, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hosri

and underwent surgery for an anterior vaginal repair, a fasial sling at:
removal of a foreign body and ovary.
7.

On September 18, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hos~:

for acute influenza.
8.

51

On December 5, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the ho r'

for generalized tremors, weakness and an anxiety state.

- 4 -
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9,

On February 25, 1974, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

and underwent surgery for the removal of a fibrous mass from her abdomen
and exploratory surgery.
10.

On July 11, 1974, Plaintiff was admitted to ths hospital for

a severe anxiety reaction.
11.

On April 9, 1975, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for

an anxiety reaction.
12.

On September 11, l975, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

and underwent a cystoscopy operation as well as exploratory surgery.
The Salt Lake City Fire Department went to the Gramme residence
concerning fires in the vicinity of the Gramme residence (R.485), and fires
at the residence (R.486), between May, l973, and June, 1974 (R.488).

The

Plaintiff testified that she was not responsible for any of the fires (R.200).
Dr. Vern Peterson, a psychiatrist, having served as the President
of the Utah Psychiatric Association, testified that Plaintiff was admitted
to St. Mark's Hospital on July 11, 1974, for a severe anxiety reaction due
to her being obsessed with the loss of femininity and the accusations being
made at the time that she had started the fires.

(R. 573).

Dr. Peterson

also testified that Plaintiff's intense emotional state in 1974 resulted from
her having a hysterectomy operation at an early age, coupled with her later
bilateral mastectomies and other surgeries.

(R. 576).
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The Defendant testified that Mrs. Gramme took tra

l

nqu11z, 1

after her operation, which tranquilizers were prescribed by her doctr,·
(R. 425).

Plaintiff testified that she had taken no drugs prior to her

operation in 1969. (R. 207), and that the drugs she used were , 1·n fact,
medication. (R. 208).

Plaintiff further testified that she had never ii;:

sleeping pills except in the hospital. (R. 208),
Dr. Vern Peterson noted on July 11, 1974, on the occasionoi
the Plaintiff's tenth admission to St. Mark's Hospital, that her social
history was "insignificant" (Exhibit 37-D), meaning drug abuse,

chro~

pill taking, and alcohol were insignificant with respect to Mrs. Gram[,
illness.

(R. 586, 587).

Dr. Peterson further testified that Plaintillnc

shown no hint of drug abuse or addiction. (R. 577), and that the costoi
$60. 00 to $80. 00 for medication per month was reasonable for an indi·
such as Plaintiff who required such medication.

(R. 587).

Plaintiff has been under the care of Dr. Vern Peterson since
1974 (R. 574).

He has had an opportunity to observe Mrs. Gramme's

fainting spells, and it was his opinion that the seizures were causedO·:
intense emotional anxiety and were not feigned in any way. (R. 576,iii
· · ta'edb·:
Plaintiff testified that the drug overdoses were precipi '

her cancer (R. 209), and that she had attempted suicide because her bee
had been mutilated by all of the surgery. (R. 212).

The Plaintifi testi.i!'

· ken with
the marriage between the parties was fine until she was stric
cancer. (R. 212).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant testified that he had known Sharon Morecroft for a
number of years,

(R. 40), and that he had started a relationship with her

beginning in October, 1975.

(R. 102).

The Plaintiff and Defendant separated in September, 1976. (R. 45);
however, prior to the separation, Defendant had traveled extensively with
Sharon Morecroft:
Mexico (R. 42);

In November of 1975, he traveled with her to Mazatlan,

in February or March, 1976, he traveled with her to San

Diego, California; in May of 1976, he traveled with her to San Carlos,
Mexico; in the spring of 1976, he traveled with her to Oroville, California,
and to Reno, Nevada (R. 46);

he traveled with her to Phoenix, Arizona

(R. 49); and to Carmel, California (R. 54).

Defendant admitted having been a frequent guest in Sharon Morecroft' s home for dinner

(R.45,46), both prior to and after the separation

of the parties. (R. 46).
Prior to the separation of the parties, the Defendant maintained
an apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah, where Sharon Morecroft visited him.
(R. 50),

The Defendant had employed Sharon Morecroft in his business
for approximately one and a half years prior to the trial of this matter.
(R. 43),

The Defendant allowed Sharon Morecroft to use his credit cards

(R. 51), and a l977 Pontiac automobile which the company had purchased, as
well as a Corvair automobile owned by the company (R. 311).

Defendant

also allowed Sharon Morecroft to use his membership in the Sports Mall (R. 56, 5i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for- digitization
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The Defendant admitted to having purchased jewelry and Clo;~
for Sharon Morecroft, (R. 43, 44, 45) and on one occasion he showedf
a gift that he had purchased for Sharon Morecroft (R.147).

Addition-'

"·

numerous occasions, Defendant refused to stay at home and eat thtm"
Plaintiff had prepared for him because as he told the Plaintiff, "I'm~_
Sharon out to dinner."

(R.146).

Based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, Delendl.l
refused to answer whether he had had sexual relations with Sharon
Morecroft.

(R. 52).

Plaintiff stayed at home with the drapes drawn after the

Defe~:

started his relationship with Sharon Morecroft. (R. 171 ).
Plaintiff testified she had never assaulted a person other thai
Sharon Morecroft (R. 231 ), whom she assaulted when the Defendant
returned from California with her in his private airplane. (R. 231). L
Plaintiff further testified that she attacked Sharon Morecroft in an atterr
to save her marriage. (R. 235).
Plaintiff admitted that she had attempted suicide because of~,
Defendant's relationship with Sharon Morecroft. (R. 212, 213).
Plaintiff pleaded with the Defendant to terminate his relations:
withSharonMorecroft. (R.147,233).

.

The Defendant's re l a t ion

ship wit:

49
Sharon Morecroft severely damaged the Plaintiff emotionally (R. ! 1.
which fact the Defendant also acknowledged. (R. 505).

- 8 -
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The money Plaintiff paid to Mr. House in Carmel, California,
was for repair of the roof on the boat and for two water tanks at the home.
(R. 287).

Plaintiff had the water storage tanks installed in the Carmel

home because of the water shortage in California at that time. (R. 305).
The fire that occurred in the Knolte home was caused by an
electrical wire under the rug.

(R. 200).

Plaintiff left the Defendant for four or five days in 1949 (R.186),
on her father's advice (R.187), and lived with another woman (R.187, 188),
and she denied being involved with another man during that period of time.
(R. 186 ).

At the time Plaintiff purchased the clothe.s in Carmel, California,

she had no clothes in California and she did not have access to her clothes
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 307, 308).

The items of clothing Defendant

removed from the home in Carmel, California, were purchased by the
Plaintiff as gifts for various people. (R. 286).
The Defendant testified that prior to the Plaintiff's operation for
breast cancer, the difficulties experienced in the marriage were the
Plaintiff's fainting, the untruth, the bickering with the family. (R. 505).
Defendant testified that while Plaintiff worked at Hudson Bay
Company, her clothing purchases would often exceed her week's earnings,
but that was not characteristic of the years when Plaintiff was employed.
(R. 468).

Plaintiff worked for Hudson Bay in 1952 or 1953, for approxi-

mately 6 to 8 months (R.130).

- 9 -
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Defendant, under cross examination, admitted that after thei
was burglarized, wherein guns and jewelry were taken

•

that h h'
.
e ired, i

private investigator and as a result, a person named Bob West

was ar:.

for the burglary and he admitted having burglarized the home. (R.Sv!.
Defendant began masonry work as a hod carrier in l949andst:I
in business for himself as a masonry contractor in 1961 on a part-time
basis and after a year or two, started in the masonry contracting busiJ:;.,
full time.

II

Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., was incorporated in 1969. :;I

Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., contracts for the masonryww
commercial buildings including schools and hotels and employs betwee:I
and 100 employees depending on the number of jobs the company is wor::
on at a particular time. (R. 6, 7).

Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., has

contracted for the masonry work on such buildings as the Language k;
Center, Provo, Utah, which contract was for $1, 789, 503,00, andtheL'·
America Hotel in Salt Lake City, Utah, which contract was for $1,028)
(Exhibit 21-P).
In 1977, Defendant was named in Contractor's Magazine as Uti
Masonry Contractor of the Year.

(R. 514).

During the period of time from 1972 through 1976, Andre Gracr~
Masonry, Inc., had gross receipts as follows:
1972 -

$480, 908. 85

(Exhibit 15-P)

1973

$523,082. 76

(Exhibit 16-P)

-
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i

1974 -

$705, 344. 86

1975

$1, 432, 904. 94 (Exhibit 17-P)

-

1976 -

(Exhibit 19-P)

$1,176,052.43

(Exhibit18-P)

The Trial Court found that the value of the marital estate was
$650, 000. 00 (Findings, R.124), and awarded to the Plaintiff the home in
Carmel, California, which both the Plaintiff and Defendant valued at
$167, 500. 00, the boat in Carmel, California, valued at $5, 000. 00, and
a Savings Certificate in the amount of $25, 000. 00, and a Datson automobile
valued at $2, 500. 00 by the Plaintiff (Exhibit 66-P), together with various
miscellaneous items of personal property which were not included in the
value of the $650, 000. 00 marital estate.

(Exhibit 25-P).

Defendant was awarded the balance of the $650, 000. 00 marital
estate, that is, $450, 000. 00 which sum included the home in Salt Lake City,
Utah; four lots in Park City, Utah; one-fifth interest in a leased home in
San Carlos, Mexico;

one-third interest in a boat in San Girlos, Mexico;

a Thunderbird automobile;

an airplane valued at $27, 000. 00;

one-fifth

interest in real property Located at 1815 West 500 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah; the $75, 000. 00 Savings Certificate with Silver King Bank of Park
City, Utah;

all of his life insurance policies.

(Exhibits 66-P and 34-D).

Additionally, Defendant was awarded the Corporation which the Court found
to have a value of $210, 800. 00.

The Court, therefore, awarded the

- 11 -
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Defendant personal property totaling $239, 200. 00
Corporation valued at $210, 800. 00.

'

together

.h

W1t

the

(Findings, R. 124).

The Defendant valued the corporation at approximately $lZO,:
as of December 31, 1976, (R. 501);

however, the Defendant under cro;.

examination admitted that his opinion as to the value of the Corporation
was based upon his accountant's opinion.

(R. 519, 520).

Mr. Bayes,

accountant for Defendant, valued the Corporation at $121,000.00. (R,'
Mr. Bayes' valuation of the Corporation was strictly on a

liquidation~,

(R. 563).
Both Mr. Bayes and Mr. Gramme, in arriving at their opinioc·
as to the value of the Corporation, deducted from the net assets of the
Corporation a stockholder loan (R. 566), which stockholder loantotaleci
$29,473.00, and the Defendant considered the $29,473.00 tobeapersot
asset of his (R. 518) since that sum was, in fact, owed to him personall·
(R. 565).

Mr. Bayes admitted that under his method of valuing the Co:·

poration, i£ the Corporation had earned income which was unreported,
the value of the Corporation would be increased in the amount of the
unreported income.

(R. 561).

Mr. Bayes admitted that he was not an

expert with respect to valuing small corporations.

(R. 549).

Frank Stewart, President of an economic and management
counseling firm

· th on tr actor'
(R. 315), who has had much experience w1 c

(R. 316), testified that in his opinion the value of Andre Gramm

- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

e Masonr

Inc., as of December 31, 1976, was $342, 900. 00.

(R. 333).

Mr. Stewart

further testified that in analyzing the Defendant's performance in the construction business, Defendant was capable of commanding a salary in the
construction business of $50, 000. 00 per year.

(R. 387).

The Defendant's adjusted gross income for the years 1972 through
1976, (a five-year period) was approximately $89, 000. 00.

During those

same years, Defendant purchased assets in excess of $300, 000. 00.

The

Defendant, based upon his privilege against self-incrimination, refused to
answer where he obtained the excess money over his income to purchase
those assets (R. 89, 90, also Exhibit 43-P and Exhibits 10-P through 14-P).
Defendant testified that his corporate tax returns reflected a loss
for 1976;

however, during 1976, Defendant personally purchased two Savings

Certificates totaling $100, 000. 00 at the Silver King State Bank in Park City,
Utah, on April 1, 1976.

(R. 110).

In addition, Defendant purchased three

lots in Park City, Utah, in 1976, for $33, 000. 00 and paid the full purchase
price in the same year.

(R. 24).

Also, in April of 1976, Defendant pur-

chased an interest in a home in San Carlos, Mexico, for $13,000. 00, which
sum was paid in full at the time (R. 30), and at the time Defendant purchased
the interest in the home in San Carlos, Mexico, he also purchased a onethird interest in a boat in San Carlos, Mexico, for $3, 000. 00, which sum
was paid in full in 1976 (R. 31, 32).

Defendant also purchased a one-fifth
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interest in a membership to a country club in San Carlos
(R. 33).

'

M

Also, in November of 1976, Defendant purchased a

.

.

exico in;:
f'

one- i!tr.

interest in real property located at 1815 West 5th South, Salt Lake Cit'
Utah, which real property was purchased for $51, 000. 00, and Defend;r
share was $3, 000. 00.

(R. 35, 36).

During 1976, in addition to Defendant's personal acquisitiono:
assets, the Corporation purchased a 1977 Pontiac automobile for $1,k
(R. 54, 55, Exhibit 18-P), and a $17, 080. 50 computer,

(Exhibit 18-P).

Defendant predicted a loss of $150, 000. 00 for the corporation:
1977;

however, again, in 1977, Defendant purchased a lot in Park Cih,

Utah, for $26, 000. 00 and paid for it in full.

(R. 24).

During the marriage, the parties traveled extensively to Orer
Las Vegas, Nevada; Carmel, California; Wyoming; Europe, and back:
(R. 149, 150).

The Defendant allowed Plaintiff to spend money freely ic

151), and the parties annually spent $2, 000. 00 to $3, 000. 00 at Christ~«
and spent considerable money on their grandchildren and their child.,;
Mrs. Gramme enjoyed entertaining guests during the marriage. (R.l';
· San Carloi
The parties owned a private airplane (R. 14) and t h e b oa t s m
Mexico, (R.16), and Carmel, California (Exhibit 66-P).

The parties

. C arme l • California.
employed a gardener to take care of the home in
which gardening
services cost $150. 00 per month.

(R. 92).

The part'e'

had hired a woman for household work in the home in Salt Lake City,
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Utah, for approximately the last ten or twelve years.
parties -were members of several social clubs.

(R. 212).

The

(R. 452).

Plaintiff is physically unable to -work because of pain in her left
arm,

lack of mobility in her left arm, and the fact that she has no feeling in

her Left hand.

(R. 222).

She tires very easily and has recurring headaches

for a period of a week to ten days.

(R. 223).

Defendant also admitted that

the Plaintiff's arm limited her physical ability to work.

(R. 468, 469).

Dr. Peterson also testified that he doubted if the Plaintiff was
presently emotionally prepared to be employed.
Plaintiff testified that Exhibit 24-P reflected an itemized list of
monthly expenditures which would sustain Plaintiff at a standard of living
to which she had become accustomed,

(R. 155: 156) and that she had no

other source of income other than the alimony awarded by the Court.

(R.158).

Plaintiff testified that living in Carmel, California, had greatly
improved her physical and emotional well-being, and that she had joined
the French Club in Carmel and goes to the symphony (R. 153, 154).

The

Plaintiff testified that she had not found it necessary to use tranquilizors
while living in Carmel, California

(R. 158, 218).

Defendant also testified that the Plaintiff's physical and emotional
well-being had improved since she had lived in Carmel, California (R ..506).
Dr. Peterson testified that he has observed a change in Plaintiff since she

- 15 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

has resided in Carmel, California, which he described as "

quite

remarkable" in that she was much more calm, physically she had,,_
bQ·

weight, and her general appearance had greatly improved.

(
R.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT UNDERSTOOD AND PROPERLY APPLIED THL
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The Defendant-Appellant, in his Brief, cites the record, spe:
cally the dialogue between the Trial Court and Defendant's Counselan:
alleges certain facts not in the record which transpired in chambers:
support his position that the Trial Court failed to consider the miscoo·i.
of the wife or the relative guilt or innocence of the parties in makingfr
award of alimony.

However, it is essential to point out that the Tria:

Court's statements and comments on the record were made inthefm
work of the Defendant's position that the Plaintiff had, by her conduct
forfeited her right to alimony.

Although the Defendant's Counselmec•I

relative guilt or innocence in his statements, the Court's statementsc
not directed to the element of relative guilt, but were directed towara:
theory of forfeiture.
After the Trial Court sustained Plaintiff's objection to Defeoi:
question to the Plaintiff concerning events that occurre

d . the ho sp1t1
in

the following dialogue between Defendant's Counsel and the Cour
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ttrar.::'

THE COURT:

A 11 right.

MR. ALLRED:

Excuse me.

THE COURT:

Suppa se you show that. What then? What does
it prove so far as this case is concerned? (R. 240)
The conduct of the wife, Your Honor, the
misconduct of the wife. (R. 240).

MR. ALLRED:

THE COURT:

Suppose you show the attack. (R. 240)
(R. 240)

Objection is sustained.
You see, we can go into
all sorts of peripheral things. We have gone back
now 20 or 30 years, and I'm not sure what you
are claiming for all of that. (R. 241) (Emphasis
added).

At this point the Court was concerned about the relevance of

matters peripheral to the issues that were before the Court.

Further on

in the dialogue between Defendant's Counsel and the Court, Defendant's

theory of a forfeiture surfaced in the following exchange:
THE COURT:

So what you are saying is old misconduct affects
the amount of alimony. (R. 242)

MR. ALLRED:

I am saying that what it does is to alleviate the
presumption that was raised by the---not a
presumption, it doesn't rise to that point, but
the really basic principle of the Alldredge case
is that alimony will, in most cases, be denied
if the wife is guilty of gross or pro longed
immoral conduct. And I'm saying that I am
attempting to establish that the mitigating
circumstance which the Court provided for
in the Alldredge case does not exist in this
circumstance be cause the misconduct is of
long origin. (R. 242) (Emphasis added).

THE COURT:

That is the position you are taking in this case?
(R. 242) (Emphasis added).
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MR. ALLRED:

That is a position that I am taking in th:,
Your Honor. (R. 242) (Emphasis a~

And further during the dialogue, the following transpired:
MR. ALLRED:

(Referring to the Alldredge case) It has·.
widely nationally cited, and I think that':·.
of McDonald vs. McDonald, and also
case of Anderson vs. Anderson, where •. ·.
Court, speaking per curium, talks abou;~.
importance of testimony pertaining to reta:
guilt or innocence of the parties. (R.Z~~.:.

tb;·.

THE COURT:

As it goes to effect a denial of alimonv'
(Emphasis added).

MR. ALLRED:

As it goes to effect a denial of alimony, o:
goes to effect the amount of awarded alim::
your Honor, both. (R. 245) •

MR. ALLRED:

. . . and that case is cited at Amjur, yourH::I
this proposition:
'It has been held that in:
sidering· the equities upon granting a divnr:'
the husband, if the Court finds that the~~'
been guilty of gross or prolonged immora:
duct, then an award of alimony to the w:iebe denied in most cases.'
That represents the central position takcc'.
Alldredge case. (R. 250)

THE COURT:

What do you suppose the language "gross~:
prolonged immoral conduct" means? (R..:

MR. ALLRED:

Excuse me?

THE COURT:

What do you support the language "gross Jr1,
0
prolonged immoral con d uc t " mea ns (R-··

MR. ALLRED:

(R. 250).

... I am saying that re 1at1ve g uilt or inno;:
b
of factor:
of the parties is one of a n~~"'e::tving th£:,
considered by the Co:.irt. ~--i
. .
al m1son.
wife is ouilty of prolonged 1mmor ~
o
f . ture as·'·
that she may be subject to a for ei ~i
alimony is concerned. (R. 253) (Empha,,,.
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--THE CO CRT:

Even though her needs and abilities of both
parties might require something different but for
that prolonged and immoral misconduct? (R. 255).

MR. ALLRED:

Well, Your Honor, I'm not saying that should
necessarily be the case, but I'm saying that the
Court has the power to consider the misconduct
of the wife as an element respecting a total
forfeiture, or the Court has the power to take
the position that if misconduct of the wife is
serious and pro longed that it can be a partial
forfeiture. (R. 255)

THE COURT:

Of course, in Aldrich v. Aldrich, when the Court
was looking at that question, they said the wife
shall have alimony in this case. (R. 256)

MR. ALLRED:

That's perfectly clear. (R. 256)

THE COURT:

All right.
B·ut you see, you are throwing some terms
out and you are saying they don't mean what they
appear to mean. By "grossly prolonged immoral
conduct or misconduct", can you point to any case
where the Court has denied alimony for gross or
prolonged immoral conduct where the conduct is
of the nature that you are alluding to here?
(R. 256) (Emphasis added).

MR. ALLRED:

Yes, I can.

McDonald v. McDonald (R. 256).

Further in the dialogue, the Court asked Defendant's Counsel to make
a proffer of proof as to what his evidence would show and the proffer of
proof was made at R. 260, at which point the Court stated:
THE COURT:

Are you claiming that the conduct in the hospital
is evidence of gross or prolonged immoral
conduct? (R. 260)

MR. ALLRED:

Am I claiming that?
I think it relates to the
conduct of Mrs. Gramme during the period of
the marriage. (R. 261).
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THE COURT:

I didn't lay down what the rules w
ere ar·
I'm just quoting the language that
' ·
You quc
from the cases, and that is "gros
s or p·,.
longed immoral conduct". It's not· ··
)Ust al
conduct, it's not just grossly prolongedcc
duct, it's grossly prolonged immoral con,:
And that's the adjective that is used IOIT.rr
the word "conduct". It is immoral conduc·
Is it your contention that that conduct up::
constitutes gross immoral conduct? (R,i·

MR. ALLRED:

••• Your Honor, you must understand sorr1
too: My client isn't here trying to avoidic
responsibilities. You must simplyundern
that we ar~ trying to .Pu~ this in a decent:it
that there is legal principle that permits;
feiture under circumstances where the co.
finds--Okay. (R. 263) (Emphasis added).

THE COURT:

And that's what he is asserting, is thatb1·
virtue of this conduct during the courseoi
the marriage she ought to be deemed to ha.
forfeited her right to support for the rem[
of her life? (R. 263) (Emphasis added).

THE COURT:

If that is not your position, then, why are·
going through this? (R. 263)

THE COURT:

That was not what I was asking. I wantlU
why you are here asserting a position t~
stitutes total forfeiture. That's what~
asserting. (R. 264) (Emphasis added).

Defendant's Counsel summarized his position to the TrialCor
with respect to his theory of forfeiture at P. 266 of the Record; howe'.c
. sue of re l a t'iv e ''uilt
Defendant in his summation failed to mention the is

. h
ct to the
but spoke solely concerning his theory of forfeiture wit respe

relevance of the evidence he was trying to introduce.
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As is set forth in the above dialogue, the context in which the
Trial Court made its statements concerned the Defendant's position that
Plaintiff, because of her conduct, had forfeited her right to alimony.

The

issue of relative guilt or innocence as bearing on an award of alimony was
not directly raised in that dialogue and the Trial Court at no point in the
record stated that relative guilt or innocence of the parties in causing
the break up of the marriage was not a factor to be considered by the
Trial Court.

In addition, Appellant in his Brief has chosen to submit facts

to this Court not in the record:
"In that dialogue, the Court said, indirectly on the record
what it had said, more directly, in chambers. Alimony, the
Court reasoned, was to be determined with reference to the
economic factors and was, in the instant case, in its entirety,
an economic judgment." (Appellant's Brief, p. 20 ).
Although Plaintiff submits that the reference to facts off the record
may be improper, Plaintiff is compelled to respond to such a statement.
Plaintiff's Counsel has no recollection of the Trial Court having
stated in Chambers that relative guilt was not to be considered or that the
Trial Court's decision would be based solely on economic considerations
and Plaintiff submits that the dialogue in the chambers, again, solely
involved Defendant's theory of forfeiture.
Plaintiff readily concedes that the relative guilt or innocence of
the parties in causing a break up of the marriage was a factor to be considered by the Trial Court.

In fact, during the trial of this matter, the
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Plaintiff cited the cases of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut. 2d, 79, 296 P.z~
Searle v. Searle (Utah, 1974) 522 P. 2d 697, for the proposition that:,
guilt or innocence was, indeed, a factor that the Court may consider::
rendering its decision.

(R. 524).

It is important to note that at the point in time, during the t:t

when the dialogue transpired between the Trial Court and Defendant's
Counsel relative to Defendant's theory of forfeiture, the Trial Court:,
already heard the testimony of the Defendant himself concerning hisrr. 1
involving Sharon Morecroft, and the Court had properly concluded at::
point in time that this case was distinguishable from Alldredge v. Alh:l
119 Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681, wherein the wife alone was guilty ofmisc:1
The facts before the Trial Court at that time clearly indicated thatgm.
may lie with both parties as was the situation in English v. English\l: 1
565 P. 2d 409, cited by the Trial Court, wherein both of the partiesw,·
granted the divorce.
The Defendant in his Brief assumes that the principle of for!::
discussed in Alldredge v. Alldredge applies to the instant case. Dum.
trial of this matter, Defendant took the position that Plaintiff's conduc
should result in a total forfeiture of alimony.
Exhibit 67).

(See for example Deie~::

Again, in this appeal, the Defendant is, in effect, askin<

f cts and ci:·
Court for a total forfeiture, without considering all o f t h e a
·

cumstances present.

This Court has stated on many occasion 5
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that ti

-firm rule can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, and each case
must be determined on the basis of the immediate fact situation before
the Court.

Wilson v. Wilson,

5 Ut. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956).

Even

the Court in Alldredge applied this flexible standard to the facts and circumstances of that case.

In Alldredge, the Court concluded that the facts

and circumstances presented to the Court did not warrant applying the
theory of forfeiture that was discussed therein.

Likewise, the facts and

circumstances of the instant case do not justify a forfeiture as urged by
the Defendant.

In the Alldredge case, the Plaintiff (husband) who was 64

years of age, was granted the divorce against the Defendant (wife), who was
53 years of age.

All of the property that the parties owned consisted of a

home and $400. 00 in a bank account.
labor of approximately $200. 00.

Plaintiff had a monthly income from

The Supreme Court concluded that the

wife's conduct did not rise to the level of gross or prolonged immoral conduet.

However, the Court also acknowledged the flexible standard that is

to be applied in all divorce cases wherein it stated:
The nature of the misconduct of the wife is for consideration
as an aid to judicial discretion in deciding whether the wife
should have alimony on divorce, and, if so, the amount thereof.
Other considerations, such as years of living and toiling together,·,.
interruptions of this way of life by dibilities not the fault of either
~ •. become a part of the picture to be viewed as a whole in
deciding the best thing to be done. Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah
504, 229 P. 2d 681 (Emphasis added).
In the Alldredge case, the other considerations which the Court
considered were:

The Defendant had no skills which she could apply in
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...

order to make herself a living;

there was no evidence that the Wifec

separate income and she was 53 years of age, and it seemed l'k l
l

would not be able to support herself.
in ill health.

e y le.:

There was evidence that the

Many of these same factors are present in the instant.

Considering all of the factors, the Court in Alldredge concluded that
was entitled to alimony.
It is submitted that the Alldredge case in its essence represt:
the standards which have long since been applied to divorce cases in"
State, that is, misconduct, together with all the facts and circumstanc·
of the. case are to be considered by the Court.

In the instant case, as

hereinabove mentioned, it is critical to note that Plaintiff (wife) was a:.1
the divorce as well as the Defendant and that her conduct cannot beisc.
and viewed in terms of the language of the Alldredge case wherein the
husband alone was awarded the divorce.

The conduct of the PlaintiJJr

be considered in light of the conduct of the Defendant.

In other word;,

relative guilt or innocence of the parties in causing a break up ol therrl
An examination of the facts relevant to the issue of the realct
·aae·I
guilt or innocence of the parties in causing a break up of the marn' ·
the following:
The Defendant blamed the fires that occurred at the residence
. ti' n De an Calli:
Cortez Street, on the Plaintiff and to support this pos1 o •

· t Plain~
testified that there was enough evidence to file charges agains
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...

(R. "189).

However, Plaintiff denied that she was responsible for any of the

fires. (R. 200).

It is also important to note that according to the testimony

of Dean Callister, the fires occurred over a relatively short period considering the length of the marriage, that is, for approximately a 13-month
pedod between May, 1973, and June, 1974.

(R. 488).

The last fire occurred

almost two and a half years before the parties separated. (R. 45).
The Defendant blamed Plaintiff for the burglaries occurring in their
own residence.

(R. 432).

However, under cross examination, Defendant

admitted that after the home was burglarized in which the guns and jewelry
were taken, that he hired a private investigator and as a result, a person
named Bob West was arrested for the burglaries and he admitted having
burglarized the home.

(R. 503, 504).

Prior to the Plaintiff's surgery for breast cancer in 1969 (Exhibit
37-D), the Defendant testified that the difficulties he had experienced in the
marriage were the Plaintiff's fainting, the untruths, the bickering with the
family.

(R. 505).

The Defendant in his Statement of Facts states:

11

The Plaintiff

was a regular drug user and began taking them as early as 1949 or 1950.
They included sleeping pills and tranquilizers.

11

(Appellant's Brief, page 10).

The specific testimony from which Defendant arrives at that
statement is as follows:
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MR. ALLRED:

What can you tell us, Mr. Gramm
e, abri
when the use 0£ drugs began and wh ."
a111 '.
consisted 0£ through the years.
·

MR. GRAMME:

Well, at the earliest stages, she to k
0 ' 1'
believe, mostly sleeping pills, Sominex
type 0£ thing. (Emphasis addedi:--·

MR. ALLRED:

How long ago did that begin?

MR. GRAMME:

Oh, as far as back as I can remember,

MR. ALLRED:

Okay, will you describe then how that ma,
itself over the years?

MR. GRAMME:

Well, I don't know exactly what she wast
before her operation, but I know she was
some type 0£ tranquilizer. I never did 101
it that deeply. Then after her operation1
take some tranquilizers prescribed tohe1
doctor and her doctor, and subsequentlyo
psychiatrist. She took many, 4 or 5 other
I don't know what they are, but I just beca
alarmed when she took overdoses of it. (R
426) (Emphasis added).

On the other hand, the Plainti££ testified that the marriagew;
until she was stricken with cancer.

(R.164, 165).

Plaintiff also testiJi.

she had never taken sleeping pills except in the hospital.

(R.208). Dr

Peterson testified that Plainti££ had shown no hints 0£ drug abuse oral

(R. 577), and that a cost 0£ $60. 00 to $80. 00 a month for her medicatio

not excessive £or an individual such as Plainti££ requiring such mediCJI

(R. 587).

Dr. Peterson further testified that the Plaintiff had a difficult

h d an

adjusting to the bilateral mastectomies (R. 576), and that he had a
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opportunity to observe Mrs. Gramme's fainting spells and that it was his
opinion that the seizures were caused by intense emotional anxiety and
were not feigned in any way.

(R. 576, 577).

The Defendant further testified that Plaintiff has threatened him
with a knife and at times he slept in the bathroom (R. 454).

However, the

Defendant admitted that the times he slept in the bathroom because of
insecurity were after he had started his relationship with Sharon Morecroft
(R. 454, 455).

The conduct of the Defendant which Plaintiff asserted caused a
break up of the marriage revolved around the Defendant's relationship with
Sharon More croft.

As the Appellant noted in his Brief: "The relationship

of the Defendant with Mrs. Morecroft was not, Defendant testified, secret or
clandestine."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 15 ).

Plaintiff readily admits that the Defendant's relationship with
Sharon Morecroft was not secret or clandestine.
flagrant.

To the contrary, it was

During the same period of time that the Defendant was living

with the Plaintiff, he traveled extensively with Sharon Morecroft:
Mexico (R. 42);

to Mazatlan,

to San Diego, California (R. 42); to San Carlos, Mexico (R. 41);

to Oroville, California and Reno, Nevada (R. 46);

to Phoenix, Arizona (R. 49);

and to Carmel, California (R. 54), while the Plaintiff stayed home with her
drapes drawn.

(R.171) (and Appellant's Brief, p. 10).

Defendant maintained

an apartment in Salt Lake City where Sharon Morecroft visited him. (R. 50).
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Defendant was a frequent guest in Sharon Morecroft' s home f
(R. 45).

or

ct·

lll!t·

The Defendant purchased jewelry and clothing for Sharon

(R. 43, 44, 45), and on one occasion Defendant showed a gift to Plaintii

he had purchased for Sharon Morecroft.

(R. 147).

On numerous occ;,

Defendant refused to stay at home and eat meals that Plaintiff had pr;,

"I am taking Sharon out to di~

for him because, he told the Plaintiff,
(R.146).

Based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, De!en':

refused to answer whether he had had sexual relations with SharonMc
croft (R. 52).
In spite of Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's highly emotioc

state due to her being obsessed with the loss of femininity (R. 573), lli
Defendant chose to publicize to the Plaintiff his relationship with Share
Morecroft.

Plaintiff pleaded with the Defendant to terminate his relltl

with Sharon Morecroft.

(R.14 7, 233 ).

The Defendant continued his rek·

ship with Sharon Morecroft for more than a year prior to the timetne:J
separated.

(R. 213).

In light of the Defendant's continued relationsrud

Sharon Morecroft, the Plaintiff had no choice but to seek this divorce.
The Trial Court considered the relative guilt or innocenceoi:
parties and in light of the relative conduct of the parties set forth abo·.i
.
. h £ lt nd graoti
the Trial Court found that each of the parties
was wit
au a

Plaintiff the divorce as well as the Defendant.

The Trial Court conside:
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the parties relative guilt or innocence and the Trial Court's di vision of
assets and award of alimony in light of the relative guilt of the parties as
well as all of the other considerations discussed later in this Brief is
supported by the facts and is equitable.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES.
Appellant asserts that the Trial Court committed legal error and
abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Defendant's witnesses.
The Trial Court based its ruling upon Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence which provides:
Except as in these Rules otherwise provided, the Judge may
in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise
a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that
such evidence would be offered.
(Emphasis added).
In deciding to exclude Defendant's preferred testimony, the Trial

Court was very careful not to exclude evidence that had not previously been
presented to the Court.

This is reflected in the following dialogue between

the Trial Court and Defendant's Counsel:
MR. ALLRED:

Well, Your Honor, I will characterize that in
the context of a proffer of proof. And I suppose
in connection with the proffer the Court can
determine if there is evidence that should come
in with these witnesses. (R. 529)
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THE COURT:

Well, now, all I want you to do is t
.
e11 ~
what you intend to offer that is ne;---'"'
.
'th;·
something that has not been prese~
that has not already been testified-..,t
· ·.
•
0 lnt'
five days that we have been in trial?'
(Emphasis added).
- ·'"

THE COURT:

I know you don't, and that's why I amt,,
difficult time understanding why you can:.
simply what new evidence you intend tot
duce through these witnesses, if any. (R,
(Emphasis added).

MR. ALLRED:

Okay. The problem with that, Your H°''·
that Mrs. George's testimony will takeo:,
mately, say 45 minutes to an hour, and;,
asking me to crystalize or capsulize inq
what I expect to elicit by way 0£ testimon,,
say, an hour. But I will try. (R. 531)

Following the above dialogue, Defendant's Counsel rnadehi;:I
of proof and theTrial Court later stated:
THE COURT:

... I don't want to cut off either side--il.
have got additional evidence that is notc·~J
I want you to understand that you haveai.
opportunity to present that on both sides,.
(R535) (Emphasis added).

Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence empowers the Trial(:.
exclude evidence if it finds the probative value of the evidence is outwd
by an undue consumption of time.

Defendant ave red to the Trial Couri.

Mrs. George's testimony would take 45 minutes to an hour.

There is:

showing in the Record that the other two witnesses' testimonywoutH:
been any shorter.

Assuming each witness would have undergone direc:

.
.
h r the pre"
examination for one hour and cross exam1nat1on for one ou •
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testimony would have consumed a full day and it may have necessitated the
Plaintiff calling other family members for rebuttal.

The Trial Court

found that the proferred testimony was cumulative or corroborative and
would necessitate an undue consumption of time.

(R. 528).

The Trial Court was very careful not to exclude evidence concerning
new facts.

The Appellant in his Brief makes no assertion that his proferred

testimony would have included new facts but only that it "would have added
materially to the weight and clarity of the evidence. 11

(Appellant's Brief,

p. 36, 37).

As is indicated by the above dialogue, Defendant's proferred
evidence was cumulative and had little probative value:
Even though proferred evidence is otherwise relevent to the
issues in a case, it will n.ot be considered relevent and material
and, therefore, admissible, when it is merely surplusage or
cumulative and is consequently unnecessary to the proper determination of the case. ( 29 AmJur 2d Evidence, page 307)

As the above quotation indicates, cumulative evidence is not
considered relevant and material and is consequently unnecessary for a
proper determination of the case.
The Appellant in his Brief has failed to make a showing as to how
the excluded testimony would have changed the Trial Court's decision.

Even

in a situation where proper evidence is erroneously excluded, the judgment
Will

not be reversed unless the excluded evidence would have had a sub-

stantial influence in bringing about a different finding upon which the
judgment is based.
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Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed , by rea::ion
_
of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) it ap pearo
of record that the proponent of the evidence either made knc.·
the substance of the evidence in a form and by a method aic:
by the Judge, or indicated the substance of the expected e~ci-·
by questions indicating the desired answers, and (b) the co,'
which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is oitoe
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably have had;
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or
finding.
Plaintiff submits that Defendant's proferred testimony
relevant because of its cumulative nature;

wast

that the Trial Court acted-

the bounds of the discretion given the Trial Court pursuant to RuleL
that the excluded testimony would not have changed the Trial Court's

'l

and Judgment.
POINT THREE
THE DECREE IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIR~:::
A.
THE ALLOCATION OF THE PROPER TY AND THE AWc
OF ALIMONY WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF~
CASE.
The Defendant asserts that the Trial Court's decision with:e;
to the division of assets was inequitable.

However, Defendant hasfi·'

show, in light of all the criteria set forth by this Court in Anders~'·
· ·
Anderson, and Wilson v. Wilson, why the Decree is
mequi· t a ble · T~e

Defendant looks solely to the amount of property awarded the

Plainti'.!' 1
d d ·1

any reference whatsoever to the fact that the Defendant was aware,.,
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approximately 2 l/4th times what the Plaintiff was awarded.

That is, the

Plaintiff was awarded property valued at approximately $200, 000. 00, and the
Defendant was awarded property valued at approximately $450, 000. 00
(Exhibit 66-P).

Therefore, the Plaintiff was awarded approximately 32%

of the marital estate while the Defendant was awarded approximately 68%
of the marital estate.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut. Zd 286, 422 P. Zd 192 (1967), this
Court stated that:
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and
equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy, useful basis.
In doing so, it is necessary for the Court to consider, in addition
to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of
all of the attendant facts and circumstances: The duration of the
marriage; the age of the parties; their social position and standards of living; their health; considerations relative to children;
the money and property they possess and how it was acquired;
their abilities and training and their present potential income.
The Defendant in asserting that the Decree is inequitable has failed
to address a majority of the considerations set forth above.
Applying the standards of Anderson to the facts of the instant case,
it is clear that the Trial Court's decision was equitable.

Duration of the Marriage:

The parties have been married for 31 years.

Age of the Parties: At the time of the hearing, the Plaintiff was
50 years old and the Defendant was 51 years old.
Social positions and Standards of living:

The parties have enjoyed

a relatively high standard of living as is indicated by the frequency that the
parties traveled, which travel included many trips to Las Vegas, Nevada;
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Oregon; Carmel, California; and to Wyoming.

Further, the partie;

to Eur ope and the Plaintiff traveled back East for a period of a
three weeks.

PPt[·.

The extent of the parties' travel is further indicated:

number of vacations that the Defendant took with Sharon Morecroit. _
Addition, the parties enjoyed the use of a private airplane valued a::.
(Exhibit 34-D).

Plaintiff was allowed to spend money freely and the:.

annually spent between $2, 000. 00 and $3, 000. 00 on Christmas. Tt:
owned a boat in San Carlos, Mexico, as well as a boat in Carmel, c_
The parties were able to maintain the residence in Salt Lake City,:::
residence in Carmel, California, as well as owning an interest in lo'
vacation home in San Carlos, Mexico.

The parties could afford a go:

for their home in Carmel, California, which cost over $150. 00 a rr.o:
and for the past 10 or 12 years, they could afford to hire a.woman to:
with the housework in the home in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The health of the parties:

The Defendant is in good health:

the record is clear that the Plaintiff is in poor health as the resultc::
numerous operations that she has undergone between 1969 and 1975.
testified that due to the surgery for breast cancer, she has little mo::·
her left arm and no feeling in her left hand and is unable to work (R.:.
.
.
.
She tires
easily
and has recurring
headaches f or a wee k t 0 ten da \'S
·

:

Dr. Peterson also testified that Plaintiff was not capable of emploi·rr.:
at the present time (R. 578).
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The Money and Property they Possess and how it was Acquired:
The record is clear that neither of the parties brought into the marriage any
assets, the Plaintiff having worked for her father prior to the marriage and
the Defendant having entered into a partnership with the Plaintiff's father
in Belgium after the marriage.

The evidence is also clear that Plaintiff

worked during a substantial period of the marriage and that her income
was used for utilities and groceries and eutertainrnent of the parties. Both
Plaintiff and Defendant testified that Plaintiff terminated her employment at
the request of the Defendant (R. 416, 135).

The evidence is also clear that

the marital estate is substantial ($650, 000.00) and that the Trial Court's
property award to the Plaintiff was substantially the Savings Certificate
and the home in Carmel, California, while the property award to the Defendant included virtually all of the parties' investments:

the lots in Park City;

the home in Salt Lake; the airplane, the interest in the home in San Carlos,
Mexico, the Commercial property, the $75, 000 savings certificate (Exhibit
66-P), as well as the corporation which is capable of generating substantial
sums of money so that Defendant's estate will continue to grow while the
Plaintiff is presently in a position where she must conserve and her assets
are not likely to increase.
The Abilities and Training of the Parties and their Present and
Potential Incomes:

The record is clear that the Plaintiff has no special

skills which would qualify her for employment which did not involve physical
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labor and the record is also clear that the Plaintiff is physically
perform physical labor (R. 222, 578).

c.n;

Plaintiff's potential incomeir

future will be restricted almost entirely to the Court's award ol aim
and to the interest she can earn on the $25, 000. 00 savings certilica:,
awarded to her.

On the other hand, the Defendant was awarded the

corporation which is capable of generating substantial income tohirr.,
if the past is any indication of the corporation's future growth (groso

1972 - $480, 908. 85, as compared to $1, 176, 052. 43 in l976), the Deie:.
can expect a substantial increase in his income in the future. Furtk
Plaintiff's expert witness Frank Stewart, testified that the Defendan!'
capable of earning a salary in the construction business of $50,000.0.
annually at the present time.
Other Factors:

Due to the Plaintiff's history of cancer as:·

as her numerous other physical disabilities, it is entirely possible a::
bable that the Plaintiff will require medical attention in the future. E
as the Plaintiff testified, because of her history of cancer, the caste.
insurance is prohibitive to her (R.158), and she is virtually selfinsuri
The Plaintiff must, therefore, look to her own estate to pay medical:
that may be incurred in the future.
In light of the above considerations, the Trial Court was obh:

endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of the econorn

ic:i'

h PY ana.

of the parties so that they could reconstruct their lives on a ap

basis.

Anderson v. Anderson (Supra).

With this responsibility inrr.::'
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Trial Court in awarding the home to Plaintiff in Carmel, California,
undoubtedly gave great weight to the Plaintiff's testimony that she desired
to live in Carmel, California (R. 154, 155);

that she had not found it necessary

to take tranquilizers while living in Carmel, California; that she has felt
very good since living in Carmel; and that her physical and emotional well
being have greatly improved.

Prior to the trial of this matter, the Plaintiff

had already began to reconstruct her life in Carmel, California.

Plaintiff

speaks French fluently and has joined the French Club in Carmel and goes
to the symphony often.

It is also important to note that the Defendant testified

that the Plaintiff's general emotional state had improved since she had been
living in Carmel (R. 506).

Also, Dr. Vern Peterson testified that he had

observed a change in Plaintiff since she had resided in Carmel, which he
described as "quite remarkable" in that she was much more calm, physically
she had gained weight, and her general appearance had greatly improved
(R. 578).

The Decree that the Court fashioned also allows the Defendant to
continue his Life virtually undisturbed from what it was prior to the divorce.
Defendant was awarded property valued in excess of $450, 000. 00 (Exhibit 66-P).
Defendant was awarded the home in Salt Lake City; the vacation home in San
Carlos, Mexico; his private airplane; the lots in Park City, Utah; the $75, 000. 00
savings certificate, as well as the corporation which generates substantial
income so that his assets will continue to grow. (See Statement of Facts,
this Brief, page 10-11).
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This Court has stated in the case of Searle v.

searle,

Ctah,

522 P. 2d 697 (1974):
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this
court
in a case of equity to review the facts as well as the law
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, the trial j~d e
has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting the fin~(
and property interests in a divorce case. The actions of the.
trial court are indulged with a presumption of validity, and~
burden is upon appellant to prove such a serious inequity as:
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. There is no fixed rule
or formula for the division of property; Section 30-3-5, c,c,
1953, provides that when a decree of divorce is made the Cc.
may make such orders in relation to property as may be
equitable. The trial court has a responsibility to endeavor
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives
on a happy and useiu.l basis.
As is set forth above, the Trial Court in this case is empowe:
with a broad discretion and his actions are indulged with a presumptic
validity.

The Trial Court's decision with respect to the property di·i.:

was equitable and well within its broad discretion and the Trial Gour:
decision fulfilled its responsibility to equitably divide the assets ina
manner to assist the parties in reconstructing their lives.
B. THE AWARD OF ALilv10NY WAS EQUITABLE AND!SSl:
PORTED BY THE FACTS.
The Defendant asserts in his Brief that the award of alimony!
Plaintiff was inequitable and that Plaintiff should be denied alimony be:
of the property award made to her.

Defendant's argument totally igni:

· · g the amoc:·
the standards that this Court has established in determmin
alimony as they apply to the facts of this case:
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-" ... The amount of alimony is measured by the wife 1 s needs and
requirements, considering her station in life, and upon the
husband's ability to pay." English v. English (Utah, 1977)
565 P. 2d 409. Henricks v. Hendrick!j 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277 (1936)
Plaintiff testified that the monthly expenditures set forth in
Exhibit 24-P, which totaled $1, 545. 00 would sustain her at the standard to
which she had become accustomed.

(An examination of the facts concerning

the standard of living is set forth in pages 33 and 34 of this Brief.
awarded Plaintiff $1, 400. 00 a month alimony.

The Court

It is important to note that

at no time during the trial did the Defendant cross examine the Plaintiff as
to her requirements and the amount of alimony she would need for those
requirements.

Further, Defendant introduced absolutely no evidence to

show that he was unable to pay $1, 400. 00 per month alimony.

In fact, it

would have been entirely reasonable for the Trial Court to conclude that
the Defendant's income for the year immediately preceding the divorce
(1976) was in excess of $150, 000. 00 as is evidenced by the amount of money
the Defendant spent for assets that were acquired in that year (see pages 1314 of this Brief).
Defendant thwarted every effort of the Plaintiff to establish the
Defendant's true income.

Based upon his privilege against self-incrimination,

Defendant refused to answer where or how he obtained the money to purchase
assets totaling over $300, 000. 00.

The purchases were made during the

years 1972 through 1976, when during the same period his adjusted gross
income was approximately $89, 000. 00.

- 39 -
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Plaintiff's expert witness Frank Stewart, testiiied that'ii;,·

--

Defendant's past performance, he could presently command a sa!a:
construction business 0£ $50, 000. 00 annually (R. 387).

In his Brie£, Defendant argues that the case 0£ Dubois.,,:.:
29 Ut.2d 75, 504P.2d1380 (1973), supports his contentionthattheF:.
in the instant case should be required to live on the income
produced from the value 0£ the property awarded to her.

that~

However,:

facts 0£ the Dubois case are clearly distinguishable from the facts it
instant case.

In the Dubois case, the Court found the marital estate:.

a value 0£ $588, 581. 00 and the Court awarded the Plaintiff (wife) app:.
mately 60o/c 0£ the marital estate, whereas in the instant case the Co•i:
awarded Plaintiff approximately 32% 0£ the marital estate.

The wile.

the Dubois case, after the action was filed, became a beneficiary to;
stantial estate and she had an expectancy in the estate of her mother''
still living but 0£ an advanced age.
in the instant case.

There has been no showing of

sue:

The nucleous 0£ the marital estate in the~:.

was the result of investments 0£ gifts from the Plaintiff's relatives,"'
in the instant case the marital estate was acquired during the marria;:
through the joint efforts of the parties.

In addition, in the Dub~"''

there is no showing that the husband had a substantial income as is t:.:
this case.

Further, the inference from a reading of the

Dub~opiniC:

the property awarded to the Plaintiff was income producing properr,,
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in the instant case the only income-producing property awarded to the
Plaintiff is the $25, 000. 00 savings certificate.
What the Defendant failed to accomplish in the Trial Court with his
theory of forfeiture (denial of alimony to the Plaintiff), he now seeks to
accomplish by urging this Court that Plaintiff should be forced to live on
the income that could be produced from the value of the property awarded
to her.

In order to support this position, the Defendant urges this Court to

impose a trust upon the Plaintiff, funded with money derived from the forced
sale of the Carmel home where she now resides.

There is absolutely no

credible evidence in the record which would support the imposition of a
trust upon the property awarded to the Plaintiff and had the Defendant
informed Plaintiff and the Court (other than in his closing argument) that
the question of imposing a trust upon Plaintiff was being tried, the Plaintiff
could have introduced testimony to rebut any evidence which could inferentially support Defendant's position.
As in the Trial Court, the Defendant on this appeal urges this Court
to deny the wife alimony without giving any consideration to the needs of the
Plaintiff or asserting any evidence to show that the Defendant is unable to
pay the amount of alimony awarded to the Plaintiff by the Trial Court.
The award of alimony was equitable and as set forth above, the
facts of this case fully support the Trial Court's award of alimony.
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POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES,..
COSTS TO THE PLAINTIFF,
A•. ,
Plaintiff fully concurs with the Defendant in his Brief, wher,.
he states:
Section 30-3-3, U,C.A., 1953, permits an award tothewue
or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute, or defot:
an action in divorce. The statute, this Court has said, does
not contemplate that the award for expenses of litigation she.
be made only in those cases where the adverse party, usu;::
the wife, is destitute or practically so, but rather when, in
sound discretion of the Court, the circumstances of the par~.
are such that in fairness to the wife, she should be given fins:
assistance by the husband in her prosecution or defense oft:·
action. (Appellant's Brief, page 48-49).
The facts in this matter clearly support an award of attorne•.

to the Plain tiff.
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the Plaintiffr.a:
incurred attorney's fees totaling $14, 920. 00, (R. 592, 594), which sum
included $2, 500. 00 Plaintiff owed for previous attorneys in this malie:
(R. 163)

Of the $14, 920. 00 that Plaintiff had incurred in attorney'sk

the Court awarded her $8, 000. 00 attorney's fees.
This matter required extensive disc ave ry, necessitated in!:·
the Defendant's own conduct.

This fact is clearly illustrated by the:.

in which Defendant answered the first set of Interrogatories propounco
him.

(Answers to Interrogatories, R. 34, and Amen d e

rogatories, R. 44).

dAnswersto~

·
the Deie::
In his Answer to those Interrogatories,
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stated that the mortgage on the home at Cortez Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
was $30, 000. 00, when, in fact, the mortgage was $15, 000. 00 (Exhibit 34-D);
he stated that the lots owned in Park City were a joint venture when, in fact,
he owned the lots himself (R. 25);

and he stated that he owned a one-half

interest in the $100, 000. 00 savings certificate at Silver King Bank, when,
in fact, he was the sole owner of the savings certificates (R. 11, 12).

It

should also be noted that the Trial Court required Plaintiff to pay her own
expert witness fees (Finding, Record l24).
In the case of Dubois v. Dubois (Supra),

the wife who was granted

the divorce and awarded 60% of the marital estate valued at $588, 581. 00
was also awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $10, 000. 00, which this
Court held was not an abuse of discretion.
The Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff was within
its discretion, was fair to the parties, and was supported by the evidence.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR THIS APPEAL.
Although the Plaintiff was not awarded, in full, the property and
alimony that she requested at the trial (Exhibit 24-P and Exhibit 66-P), the
Plaintiff chose not to appeal the Trial Court's decision.

However, the

Defendant did choose to appeal the Trial Court's decision and as a result
the Plaintiff has had to incur substantial attorney's fees.
Section 30-3-3, U. C. A. (1953), provides that the Court can award
attorney's fees and this Court has held that a reasonable attorney's fee may
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be awarded on appeal.

See Anderson v. Anderson (Supra) H d ..

,~

Hendricks (Supra), Peterson v. Peterson, llZ Utah 54Z, L89 P.Zd

t.

9

Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees on tuis
c,
Appe:
and this case should be remanded to the District Court for a determi:.
of the amount of the attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court in this case rendered its decision with cons::
ation given to all of the facts and consideration; involved in this case,
including the conduct of each of the parties.

In light of all of the facts and circumstances, the Trial Cou::
formulated a Decree that was equitable to eac.h of the parties. TheD:.j
was awarded property valued at $450, 000. 00, which included his man.
investments and the corporation which is capable of generating subsli.:
income to him.

The division of assets allows Defendant to continuet

life in a manner virtually undisturbed from what it was prior to thedi
The Decree awarded to Plaintiff property valued at $200,00u.
which included the home in Carmel, California, where the Plaintilfdi:
to reside.

The Decree allows Plaintiff an opportunity to continue to::

struct her life in Carmel.
The Trial Court's award of alimony to Plaintiff was basedu::
Tt of Defei:
her need, in light of her standard of living, and on the a b l l Y
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to pay such alimony.

The award of alimony permits Plainti££ to recon-

struct her life on a happy and useful basis.
The Decree of the Trial Court should be affirmed in its entirety
and Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK C. McLACHLAN
343 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
RALPH J. HAFEN
924 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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hereby certify I served three (3) copies of the foregoing

Respondent's Brief, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Joel
M. Allred, Attorney for Defendant, Appellant, at 345 South State Stree:
Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this _ _ _day of March, 1978,

MARK C.
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